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Abstract: 
This paper develops a two sector model of endogenous economic growth with public capital 
where private goods and public investment goods are produced with different production 
technologies. The government buys public investment goods produced by private producers; 
and the government is a monopsonist in this market. We analyse properties of growth rate 
maximizing and welfare maximising fiscal policies in the steady state equilibrium. It is 
shown that the government cannot (can) control the production of public investment good 
changing the income tax rate (price of public investment good). The growth rate maximizing 
price of the public investment good is not necessarily equal to its competitive price. However, 
growth rate maximising income tax rate is equal to the elasticity of private good’s output with 
respect to public capital but is independent of technology in public good production. Welfare 
maximising solution is not necessarily identical to the growth rate maximising solution even 
in the steady state equilibrium.  
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1. Introduction  
 Public capital plays a crucial role on economic growth. Barro (1990) makes the first 
attempt to incorporate the productive role of public infrastructure in an endogenous growth 
model; and also analyses the properties of optimal income tax used to finance this productive 
public expenditure. However, Barro (1990) treats productive public expenditure as a flow 
variable, rather than a stock variable. Futagami et al. (1993) extends Barro (1990) model 
considering public capital as a stock variable. After these two models, lots of works have 
been done in this direction1. However, in both Barro (1990) and Futagami et al. (1993), both 
public good and final private good are produced by private firms using identical technology; 
and then the government buys public goods from private firms using tax revenue and 
provides freely to private producers as non-rival public input.2 In these models, the 
government chooses optimal tax rate such that the rate of growth and the welfare level are 
maximized.   
This type of modeling has two major problems. First of all, these models assume that 
the production functions of both goods are identical. In Barro’s own words, “As long as the 
government and the private sector have the same production functions, the results would be 
the same if the government buys private inputs and does its own production, instead of 
purchasing only final output from the private sector, as I assume.” So it is important to derive 
the properties of optimal income tax rate where private goods and public goods are produced 
with different production technologies. Few papers, such as Dasgupta (1999, 2001), Dasgupta 
and Shimomura (2006), Pintea and Turnovsky (2006), Turnsovsky and Pintea (2006) 
consider different production functions for producing private goods and public goods. 
However, Pintea and Turnovsky (2006) and Turnsovsky and Pintea (2006) do not derive 
optimal tax rate analytically. On the other hand, Dasgupta (2001) and Dasgupta and 
Shimomura (2006) do not consider income taxation3. Only Dasgupta (1999) derives optimal 
tax rate. However, Dasgupta (1999) finds out that the optimal income tax rate is zero and the 
government should earn entire revenue only by charging the private sector firms for usage of 
public services on per unit basis. This may be impossible to implement when public services 
are non-rival and non-excludable in nature; and firms will try to take a free ride. So we stick 
to the idea of Barro (1990) of freely distributing services of public capital and of charging 
income taxes to finance its cost.  
The second problem with Barro (1990) type of modeling is more severe because it is 
assumed that the government buys public goods from private producers at the competitive 
market price. Competitive relative price is equal to unity in the case of identical production 
1 Some examples are Tsoukis and Miller (2003), Petraglia (2003), Clemens (2001), Chen (2003), Hung (2005), 
Gupta and Barman (2009, 2010, 2013), Barman and Gupta (2010), Agénor (2008), Kitaura (2010), Eicher and 
Turnovsky (2000), Turnovsky (2000), Ghosh and Roy (2004), Ott and Turnovsky (2006), Ghosh and Gregoriou 
(2008), Kosempel (2004), Baier and Glomm (2001), Marrero and Novales (2007). 
2 In Barro’s own words, “But conceptually, it is satisfactory to think of the government as doing no production 
and owning no capital. Then the government just buys a flow of output (including services of highways, sewers, 
battleships, etc.) from the private sector. These purchased services, which the government makes available to 
households, correspond to the input that matters for private production ……..”. 
3 Dasgupta and Shimomura (2006) considers lump sum taxes but not per unit income tax.   
                                                        
functions. However, why the government should charge a competitive price is not clear. The 
government is the only buyer; and so it should act as a monopsonist and should use the 
relative price as a tool to maximize its objective.    
This motivates us to develop the present model. We attempt to analyse the properties 
of optimal income tax rate used to finance investment in public capital in a two sector 
economy with different production functions for producing final good and public investment 
good. In this model, the private sector produces public investment good and sells it to the 
government who has a monopsony power to set the buying price. Thus this price is also used 
to control allocation of resources between these two sectors. Otherwise, our model has a 
framework similar to what Futagami et al. (1993) model has.   
We derive many interesting results from this model. First of all, the government can 
affect inter-sectoral allocation of resources not by changing the income tax rate but by 
altering the buying price of public investment good. The allocative share of private capital to 
the production of public investment good varies positively with this price. Secondly, the 
government’s budget balancing income tax rate also varies positively with the buying price of 
public investment good. Thirdly, growth rate maximising buying price of public investment 
good is not necessarily equal to its competitive price. Fourthly, the growth rate maximising 
income tax rate is equal to the elasticity of output with respect to public capital in the 
production of final private goods only but is independent of the production technology to 
produce public investment good. Lastly, welfare maximising solutions are different from 
growth rate maximising solutions even in the steady state growth equilibrium. These results 
are different from the corresponding results obtained from Barro (1990), Futagami et al. 
(1993) etc.  
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the 
model. Section 3 deals with the properties of steady state growth equilibrium and growth rate 
maximizing policies. Section 4 derives properties of the optimal (welfare maximizing) fiscal 
policies in the steady state equilibrium; and section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. The Model  
The representative household-producer produces both final good and public 
investment good using private capital and public capital. Public investment good is defined as 
the additional stock of non-rival public capital. Production functions of two sectors with 
different technologies are given by           𝑌𝑌 = 𝐴𝐴(𝜃𝜃𝐾𝐾)𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼     where     𝛼𝛼 ∈ (0,1)    and   𝐴𝐴 > 0      ;                                                (1) 
and           ?̇?𝐺 = 𝐵𝐵[(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐾𝐾]𝛽𝛽𝐺𝐺1−𝛽𝛽     where     𝛽𝛽 ∈ (0,1)    and     𝐵𝐵 > 0    .                                   (2) 
Here, Y, K, G and θ denote amount of final good, stock of private capital, stock of public 
capital and the share of private capital allocated to final goods sector respectively. ?̇?𝐺 
represents the amount of public investment good. The government sets the relative price of ?̇?𝐺; 
and the household–producer determines the allocation of resources between two sectors. 
Public capital does not depreciate over time.  
 The government buys all ?̇?𝐺 at the relative price, µ; and freely provides the whole of G 
to the household-producers. An income tax at the rate, τ, is charged; and the balanced budget 
equation is given by             𝜏𝜏𝑌𝑌 + 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏?̇?𝐺 = 𝜏𝜏?̇?𝐺  .                                                                                                                         (3) 
The representative household is infinitely lived; and she derives instantaneous utility 
from consumption of final goods only; and maximizes her discounted present value of 
instantaneous utility subject to her intertemporal budget constraint. The optimization problem 
is given by the following.  
          𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀� 𝑐𝑐1−𝜎𝜎 − 11 − 𝜎𝜎 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌∞
0
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑                                                                                                            (4) 
subject to,      ?̇?𝐾 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝑌𝑌 + (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝜏𝜏?̇?𝐺 − 𝑐𝑐        ;                                                              (5)                          𝐾𝐾(0) = 𝐾𝐾0      ;        𝜃𝜃 ∈ [0 , 1] 
          and       𝑐𝑐 ∈ �0, (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝑌𝑌 + (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝜏𝜏?̇?𝐺�   .      
Here c is the level of consumption of final goods, and 𝐾𝐾0 is historically given initial 
private capital stock. 𝜎𝜎 represents the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to 
consumption and ρ denotes the constant rate of discount. Savings is always invested; and 
there is no depreciation and consumption of private capital.  
 Here c and θ are two control variables and K is the only state variable. Solving this 
dynamic optimisation problem, we obtain4            (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝜃𝜃𝛼𝛼−1𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼 = 𝜏𝜏(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐵𝐵𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛽𝛽−1𝐾𝐾𝛽𝛽𝐺𝐺1−𝛽𝛽     ;                                       (6) 
and 
          ?̇?𝑐
𝑐𝑐
= (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝜃𝜃𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼−1𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼 + 𝜏𝜏(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐵𝐵𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾𝛽𝛽−1𝐺𝐺1−𝛽𝛽 − 𝜌𝜌 
𝜎𝜎
      .                    (7) 
Equation (6) shows the efficient allocation of private capital between the two sectors. 
It implies that the after tax value of marginal product of private capital is same in both the 
sectors. Equation (6) can be written as  
          �𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼
𝐵𝐵𝛽𝛽
�
[(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐾𝐾]1−𝛽𝛽(𝜃𝜃𝐾𝐾)1−𝛼𝛼 = 𝜏𝜏𝐺𝐺𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽     .                                                                                        (6𝑀𝑀) 
4 Derivation of equations (6) and (7) are shown in the appendix.  
                                                        
Equation (6a) shows that the intersectoral allocation of private capital is independent of the 
income tax rate, 𝜏𝜏, but depends on the government’s buying price of public investment good, 
𝜏𝜏. In Barro (1990), Futagami et al. (1993) and in many other one sector models, the income 
tax rate, 𝜏𝜏, is a tool to determine the level of production. However, in this model, 𝜏𝜏 does not 
play any such role but the relative price, 𝜏𝜏, can be used as a tool to affect the intersectoral 
allocation of resources and thus the level of production in the two sectors. From equation (6a) 
we have 
          �1
𝜃𝜃
− 1�1−𝛼𝛼 = 𝜏𝜏 �𝐺𝐺
𝐾𝐾
�
𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽 𝐵𝐵
𝐴𝐴
𝛽𝛽
𝛼𝛼
        ;                                                                                        (6𝑏𝑏) 
and this equation shows that 𝜃𝜃 varies inversely with 𝜏𝜏 given K and G. So as the government 
raises (lowers) the buying price of public investment good, household-producers allocate 
more (less) resources for its production. This is so because an increase in 𝜏𝜏 raises the after tax 
value of marginal product of private capital in the public good producing sector; and so the 
share of private capital is increased in that sector. If production functions are identical, i.e., if 
A = B and α = β, then  
          �1 − 𝜃𝜃
𝜃𝜃
�
1−𝛼𝛼 = 𝜏𝜏     .                                                                                                                   (6𝑐𝑐) 
So, we can establish the following proposition.  
Proposition 1: Government cannot affect intersectoral allocation of private capital by 
changing the income tax rate but can raise (lower) its allocative share to the public 
investment good producing sector by charging a higher (lower) relative price of that good.   
 Equation (7) describes the demand rate of growth consumption which is defined as 
the excess of marginal return of private capital accumulation over the rate of discount 
normalized with respect to the elasticity of marginal utility.  
 Now, from equation (2), we obtain the growth rate of public capital as given by 
          𝑔𝑔 = ?̇?𝐺
𝐺𝐺
= 𝐵𝐵(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛽𝛽 �𝐾𝐾
𝐺𝐺
�
𝛽𝛽     .                                                                                                    (8) 
Using equations (6a) and (8), we obtain 
          𝜃𝜃 = 11 + 𝐵𝐵 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝜏𝜏𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�
1
1−𝛼𝛼
       .                                                                                             (9) 
Equation (9) shows that, if we consider identical production functions in the two sectors, i.e., 
if A = B and α = β, then 
          𝜃𝜃 = 11 + 𝜏𝜏 11−𝛼𝛼        .                                                                                                                     (9𝑀𝑀) 
If 𝜏𝜏 = 1, then 𝜃𝜃 = ½. So, if the relative price is equal to unity, private capital will be allocated 
equally between two sectors.  
Again, using equations (1), (2), (3), (6a) and (9), we obtain 
          𝜏𝜏 = 𝛼𝛼 𝐵𝐵
𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝜏𝜏𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�
1
1−𝛼𝛼
𝛼𝛼
𝐵𝐵
𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝜏𝜏𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�
1
1−𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 < 1       .                                                                               (10) 
Equation (10) shows that the government’s budget balancing income tax rate is positive but is 
less than unity. From equation (10), we have 
          𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏
𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏
= 𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛼𝛼 𝛼𝛼 𝐵𝐵
𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) � 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�
1
1−𝛼𝛼
𝜏𝜏
𝛼𝛼
1−𝛼𝛼
�𝛼𝛼
𝐵𝐵
𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝜏𝜏𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�
1
1−𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽�2 > 0        .                                                              (11) 
Equations (11) shows that the government’s budget balancing income tax rate varies 
positively with 𝜏𝜏. This is so because an increase in the buying price, 𝜏𝜏, raises the government 
expenditure and so the revenue must rise to balance the budget. However, θ falls and hence Y 
falls. So the tax rate, τ, must rise to balance the budget. This result is stated in the following 
proposition.  
Proposition 2: The budget balancing income tax rate varies positively with the government’s 
buying price of public investment good.  
 
 3. The Steady State Equilibrium 
 The equations of motion of the system are given by equations (5), (7) and (8). In the 
steady-state growth equilibrium,  
          𝑔𝑔 = ?̇?𝐺
𝐺𝐺
= ?̇?𝐾
𝐾𝐾
= ?̇?𝑐
𝑐𝑐
          .                                                                                                               (12) 
Now using equations (7), (8), (9), (10) and (12) we have5  
5 Derivation of equation (13) is shown in appendix.  
                                                        
          𝜌𝜌 + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔 = 𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵1𝛽𝛽𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔𝛽𝛽−1𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛼𝛼 �𝐵𝐵 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)𝛽𝛽 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) � 𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼� 11−𝛼𝛼�
              .                                                           (13) 
Equation (13) solves for g and this solution is unique. This equation also shows the nature of 
the relationship between 𝜏𝜏 and g.  
Now, the government’s objective is to maximise the steady-state equilibrium growth 
rate, g, with respect to 𝜏𝜏. We use the first order condition and then obtain the following.6   
          𝜏𝜏 = 𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼
𝛼𝛼1−2𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵
𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔
𝛽𝛽−𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽 𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼
       .                                                                                                      (14) 
 Using equations (13) and (14), we have  
          (𝜌𝜌 + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔∗)𝑔𝑔∗1−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽 = 𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼2𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵1−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽             .                                                    (15) 
Equation (15) solves for the maximum value of 𝑔𝑔∗. The left hand side of equation (15) is an 
increasing function of 𝑔𝑔∗; and its right hand side is independent of 𝑔𝑔∗. So there exists a 
unique value of 𝑔𝑔∗.  
Putting this value of 𝑔𝑔∗ in equation (14), we obtain7   
          𝜏𝜏∗ = 𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼
𝛼𝛼1−2𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵
𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽(𝑔𝑔∗)𝛽𝛽−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽 𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼        .                                                                                               (16) 
This equation (16) shows that the growth rate maximising 𝜏𝜏 is not necessarily equal to unity. 
Even if we consider identical production technology in both the sectors, i.e., A = B and 𝛼𝛼 =
𝛽𝛽, then also  
          𝜏𝜏∗ = �1 − 𝛼𝛼
𝛼𝛼
�
1−𝛼𝛼        ;                                                                                                            (16𝑀𝑀) 
and hence 𝜏𝜏∗ = 1 if and only if 𝛼𝛼 = 1/2, i.e., if and only if production function is symmetric 
in terms of its arguments. This is stated in the following proposition.  
Proposition 3: The steady-state equilibrium growth rate maximising buying price of public 
investment good is not necessarily equal to its competitive price. The equality is obtained 
only if production technology in both the sectors are identical and symmetric.  
6 Derivation of equation (14) is shown in the appendix.  
7 The second order condition of maximisation of growth rate with respect to 𝜏𝜏 is satisfied. From equation (13), it 
can be shown very easily that 𝑑𝑑
2𝑔𝑔
𝑑𝑑2𝜇𝜇
< 0 when equation (14) holds.  
                                                        
In Barro (1990) and Futagami et al. (1993), this symmetry assumption is not made but 
the government’s buying price of public good is normalized to unity, i.e., to the competitive 
price with identical technology.  
Using equations (16), (9) and (10), we obtain  
          𝜃𝜃∗ = 𝛼𝛼2
𝛼𝛼2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛼𝛼)         ;                                                                                                      (17) 
and           𝜏𝜏∗ = 1 − 𝛼𝛼        .                                                                                                                          (18) 
Here 𝜃𝜃∗ represents the growth rate maximising allocation of private capital to the final goods 
producing sector in the steady state growth equilibrium. Equation (17) shows that 𝜃𝜃∗ varies 
inversely with β and positively with α. This is so because, as β (α) rises, productivity of 
private capital rises in the public investment good (final good) sector; and, as a result, 
allocative share of private capital to public investment good (final good) sector goes up. In 
the case of identical production technology, 𝜃𝜃∗ = 𝛼𝛼. So we can establish the next proposition.  
Proposition 4: The growth rate maximising allocative share of private capital to final good 
(public investment good) producing sector varies positively (inversely) with the private 
capital elasticity of output of final good and varies inversely (positively) with the private 
capital elasticity of output of public investment good.  
Equation (18) leads to the following proposition.  
Proposition 5: The steady state equilibrium growth rate maximising income tax rate is equal 
to the elasticity of output of final good with respect to public capital but is independent of the 
production technology in the public investment good producing sector.  
 In Barro (1990) and Futagami et al. (1993), input elasticities of output are same in 
both the sectors. So this problem does not arise.  
 
 4. Welfare Maximization  
 We use equations (1), (2), (4), (5), (7), (8), (9) and (10) to obtain the welfare level of 
the representative household, denoted by 𝜔𝜔; and it is given by8 
8 See appendix for derivation of equation (19).  
                                                        
          𝜔𝜔 = ⎣⎢⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝜌𝜌
𝛼𝛼 + 𝑔𝑔 �𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼 − 1� + (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑔𝑔2𝛽𝛽−1−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) 𝐴𝐴 1𝛼𝛼−1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−21−𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏2−𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵 1𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)𝛽𝛽2−𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼
�1 + 𝐵𝐵 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝜏𝜏𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�
1
1−𝛼𝛼
� �𝛽𝛽 + 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝜏𝜏𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�
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�
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⎤
1−𝜎𝜎
𝐾𝐾0
𝜎𝜎−1(1 − 𝜎𝜎)[𝜌𝜌 − 𝑔𝑔(1 − 𝜎𝜎)]+ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑      .                                                                                                         (19) 
If 𝜎𝜎 > 𝛼𝛼 and if 𝜌𝜌 − 𝑔𝑔(1 − 𝜎𝜎) > 0, then equation (19) shows that 𝜔𝜔 varies positively with g 
when α = β. So the growth rate maximising solution is identical to the welfare maximising 
solution in the steady state equilibrium when α = β. However, when α ≠ β, i.e., production 
technologies of two sectors are not identical, then the welfare maximising solution is not 
identical to the growth rate maximising solution even in the steady state equilibrium. From 
(19), we obtain9 
          𝑑𝑑𝜔𝜔
𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏
�
𝜇𝜇=𝜇𝜇∗
=
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⎨
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⎧
�
𝜌𝜌
𝛼𝛼 + 𝑔𝑔∗ �𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼 − 1� + 𝐴𝐴(𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑔𝑔∗𝛼𝛼−1𝛽𝛽 𝐵𝐵1−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽 𝛽𝛽1−𝛼𝛼[𝛼𝛼2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛼𝛼)](1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼−2𝛼𝛼1−2𝛼𝛼�−𝜎𝜎
𝐾𝐾0
𝜎𝜎−1[𝜌𝜌 − 𝑔𝑔∗(1 − 𝜎𝜎)]
⎭
⎪⎪
⎬
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⎫
 
                                                            .     �(𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑔𝑔∗𝛽𝛽−1𝛽𝛽 𝐵𝐵1𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼2𝛽𝛽[𝛼𝛼2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛼𝛼)]2 �         .                                            (20) 
If 𝜎𝜎 > 𝛼𝛼 and 𝜌𝜌 > 𝑔𝑔∗(1 − 𝜎𝜎), then the right hand side of equation (20) is positive (zero) when 
α > (=) β. This implies that the welfare maximising value of 𝜏𝜏 is higher than the growth rate 
maximising value of 𝜏𝜏 when the final private good sector is more private capital intensive 
than the public investment good sector. As a result, the welfare maximising value of income 
tax rate, 𝜏𝜏, exceeds the growth rate maximising value of income tax rate10. Similarly, the 
welfare maximising value of θ also exceeds the growth rate maximising value of θ11.   
Barro (1990) and Futagami et al. (1993) show that growth rate maximising income tax 
rate is identical to the welfare maximising income tax rate in the steady state equilibrium. 
However, we find that the welfare maximising solution is different from the growth rate 
maximising solution even in the steady state equilibrium when we consider different 
production functions for different goods. However two solutions are always identical with 
identical production technology. So our result generalises the result of Barro (1990) and 
Futagami et al. (1993). This result is stated in the following proposition.  
9 See appendix for derivation of equation (20).  
10 Equation (11) shows the positive relationship between 𝜏𝜏 and 𝜏𝜏.  
11 Equation (9) shows the inverse relationship between θ and 𝜏𝜏.  
                                                        
Proposition 6: Welfare maximising fiscal policies and welfare maximising intersectoral 
allocation of private capital are different from (identical to) growth rate maximising fiscal 
policies and growth rate maximising intersectoral allocation respectively in the steady state 
equilibrium when two sectors have different (identical) production technologies.  
 
 5. Conclusions  
This paper constructs a simple two sector model with public capital; and derives the 
properties of optimal fiscal policies in the steady state equilibrium. Both final good and 
public investment good are produced by the private sector using different production 
technologies. However, in this model, the government buys public good from private 
producers at a monopsony price and this buying price is a tool to control allocation of 
resources between these two sectors. This is how the present model differs from models like 
Barro (1990), Futagami et al. (1993) etc.   
 Various interesting findings are obtained here. First, the government can affect inter-
sectoral allocation of private capital not by changing the income tax rate but by altering the 
buying price of public investment good. This price positively (inversely) affects the share of 
private capital allocated to the production of public good (final good). Secondly, 
government’s budget balancing income tax rate varies positively with the buying price of 
public good. Thirdly, growth rate maximising buying price of public good is not necessarily 
equal to its competitive price. Fourthly, the growth rate maximising income tax rate is equal 
to the elasticity of output of final good with respect to public capital but is independent of the 
production technology of public good. At last, welfare maximising solutions are not 
necessarily identical to growth rate maximising solutions even in the steady state equilibrium.  
 However, our model is abstract and does not consider many aspects of reality. We do 
not incorporate the congestion effect of capital accumulation on productivity; and do not 
consider the role of non-productive public services in the households’ utility. Assumption of 
a benevolent government and exclusion of its political considerations is also a restrictive one. 
We plan to extend this model in those directions in future.    
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Appendix:  
Derivation of equations (6) and (7): 
Using equations (4) and (5), we construct the Current Value Hamiltonian as given by 
          𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐1−𝜎𝜎 − 11 − 𝜎𝜎 + 𝜆𝜆�(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝑌𝑌 + (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝜏𝜏?̇?𝐺 − 𝑐𝑐�       .                                                     (𝐴𝐴. 1) 
Here 𝜆𝜆 is the co-state variable. Incorporating equations (1) and (2) in equation (A.1); and then 
maximising it with respect to c and 𝜃𝜃, we obtain following first order conditions.            𝑐𝑐−𝜎𝜎 − 𝜆𝜆 = 0     ;                                                                                                                        (𝐴𝐴. 2) 
and           𝜆𝜆(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴(𝐾𝐾)𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝜃𝜃𝛼𝛼−1 = 𝜆𝜆𝜏𝜏(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐵𝐵[𝐾𝐾]𝛽𝛽𝐺𝐺1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛽𝛽−1        .                   (𝐴𝐴. 3) 
From equation (A.3), we obtain equation (6) in the body of the paper.    
Again from equation (A.1), we have  
          ?̇?𝜆
𝜆𝜆
= 𝜌𝜌 − (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼−1𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝜃𝜃𝛼𝛼 − 𝜏𝜏(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐵𝐵𝐾𝐾𝛽𝛽−1𝐺𝐺1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛽𝛽      ;                 (𝐴𝐴. 4) 
and from equation (A.2), we have  
          ?̇?𝜆
𝜆𝜆
= −𝜎𝜎 ?̇?𝑐
𝑐𝑐
        .                                                                                                                          (𝐴𝐴. 5) 
Using equations (A.4) and (A.5), we have equation (7) in the body of the paper.  
Derivation of equation (13): 
From equation (7), we have  
          𝜌𝜌 + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝜃𝜃𝛼𝛼 �𝐺𝐺
𝐾𝐾
�
1−𝛼𝛼 + 𝜏𝜏(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐵𝐵𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛽𝛽 �𝐺𝐺
𝐾𝐾
�
1−𝛽𝛽         .                     (𝐴𝐴. 6) 
From equation (8), we have  
          �𝐺𝐺
𝐾𝐾
� = 𝐵𝐵1𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)
𝑔𝑔
1
𝛽𝛽
      .                                                                                                            (𝐴𝐴. 7) 
From equations (9), (10), (A.6) and (A.7), we obtain equation (13) in the body of the paper. 
Derivation of equation (14): 
Taking log on both sides of equation (13) and then differentiating it with respect to 𝜏𝜏 and 
assuming 𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔
𝑑𝑑𝜇𝜇
= 0, we obtain  
          1
𝜏𝜏
= 𝛼𝛼1 − 𝛼𝛼 𝜏𝜏
𝛼𝛼
1−𝛼𝛼 �
𝐵𝐵
𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)𝛽𝛽 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) � 1𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�
1
1−𝛼𝛼
�
1 + 𝛼𝛼 �𝐵𝐵 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)𝛽𝛽 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) � 𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼� 11−𝛼𝛼�
           .                                                             (𝐴𝐴. 8) 
From equation (A.8), we obtain equation (14) in the body of the paper.  
Derivation of equation (19): 
From equation (4), we obtain  
          𝜔𝜔 = 𝑐𝑐01−𝜎𝜎[𝜌𝜌 − 𝑔𝑔(1 − 𝜎𝜎)](1 − 𝜎𝜎) + 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑      .                                                                   (𝐴𝐴. 9) 
Here, 𝑐𝑐(0) = 𝑐𝑐0.  
From equation (5), we obtain 
          𝑐𝑐0 = 𝐾𝐾0 �(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴(𝜃𝜃)𝛼𝛼 �𝐺𝐺0𝐾𝐾0�1−𝛼𝛼 + (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝜏𝜏𝐵𝐵(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛽𝛽 �𝐺𝐺0𝐾𝐾0�1−𝛽𝛽 − 𝑔𝑔�        .         (𝐴𝐴. 10) 
Using equations (7) and (A.10), we obtain  
          𝑐𝑐0 = 𝐾𝐾0 �𝜌𝜌 + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼 + (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝜏𝜏𝐵𝐵(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛽𝛽 �𝐺𝐺0𝐾𝐾0�1−𝛽𝛽 �𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼 � − 𝑔𝑔�        .                     (𝐴𝐴. 11) 
Using equations (8) and (A.11), we obtain   
          𝑐𝑐0 = 𝐾𝐾0 �𝜌𝜌 + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼 + (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝜏𝜏𝐵𝐵(1 − 𝜃𝜃)�𝐵𝐵1𝛽𝛽
𝑔𝑔
1
𝛽𝛽
�
1−𝛽𝛽
�
𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽
𝛼𝛼
� − 𝑔𝑔�      .                      (𝐴𝐴. 12) 
Using equations (9), (10) and (A.12), we obtain    
          𝑐𝑐0 = 𝐾𝐾0
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                                                                                                                                                  .          (𝐴𝐴. 13) 
Using equations (A.9) and (A.13), we obtain equation (19) in the body of the paper.  
Derivation of equation (20): 
Differentiating equation (19) with respect to 𝜏𝜏 and evaluating it at 𝜏𝜏 = 𝜏𝜏∗, we obtain 
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𝜏𝜏∗
𝛼𝛼
1−𝛼𝛼1 − 𝛼𝛼 𝐵𝐵 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔∗) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) � 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�
1
1−𝛼𝛼
�1 + 𝐵𝐵 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔∗) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝜏𝜏∗𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 �
1
1−𝛼𝛼
�
−
𝜏𝜏∗
𝛼𝛼
1−𝛼𝛼1 − 𝛼𝛼 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔∗) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) � 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�
1
1−𝛼𝛼
�𝛽𝛽 + 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔∗) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝜏𝜏∗𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 �
1
1−𝛼𝛼
�
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Now, from equations (9) and (10), we find that the last bracket term is equal to � 1
𝜇𝜇∗
� �
2−𝛼𝛼
1−𝛼𝛼
−
1
1−𝛼𝛼
[(1 − 𝜃𝜃∗) + 𝜏𝜏∗]�. Again, from equation (9), it appears that �1 + 𝐵𝐵 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔∗) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝜇𝜇∗𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 � 11−𝛼𝛼� is 
equal to � 1
𝜃𝜃∗
�; and from equations (9) and (10), we find that �𝛽𝛽 + 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔∗) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝜇𝜇∗𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 � 11−𝛼𝛼� is equal 
to 𝛼𝛼(1−𝜃𝜃∗)
𝜃𝜃∗𝜏𝜏∗
. Incorporating all these equalities and putting values of 𝜏𝜏∗, 𝜏𝜏∗ and 𝜃𝜃∗ from 
equations (16), (17) and (18), we obtain equation (20).   
